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Abstract
It has been proven by Lee [1] that the grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven paradox are precluded for two-
and three-state graphical models. We prove that both paradoxes are also precluded for a general n-state model. In
addition, we present a new time travel paradox in this paper.
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The idea of traveling back in time to change the past is probably one of the oldest scientiﬁc issues that have given
rise to much imagination. There are numerous publications presenting the possibilities [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15] and impossibilities [16, 17, 18, 19] of building a time machine. There is also a school of thought that
hypothesize that time travel is impossible based on reasoning that lead to time travel paradoxes [20]. Two popular
time travel paradoxes are the grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox [2]. The grandfather
paradox states that a time traveler travels back in time to kill his grandfather before his father was conceived. This
leads to a paradox because the time traveler would not exist at present and hence could not travel back in time to kill
his grandfather. The Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox states that a time traveler travels back in time to present
the proof of a mathematical theorem so that it can be recorded in a document in which the time traveler reads in the
future. One way to avoid such paradoxes is to forbid time travel. However, time travel could still be possible while
avoiding the above mentioned paradoxes if we impose additional conditions that events happening in the time line
must be self-consistent. This self-consistency principle has been proposed by several authors [1, 2, 3, 21].
Recently, Lee [1] has shown for the ﬁrst time that the grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven theorem
paradox are related to the basic axioms of probabilities. Imposing the basic axioms of probabilities, such as normal-
ization and semi-positive deﬁniteness, precludes both the grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven paradox. The
mathematical derivation to preclude these paradoxes was done on two- and three-state discrete time graphical mod-
els [22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. This model resembles a Markov Chain with a single backward loop in time. Fig. 1 illustrates
such a model where σ j, j = 1, · · · n represents the state sampled at time j.
σ1 → σ2 → σ3 → σ4 · · · → σi · · · → σk · · · → σn

Figure 1: A simple cyclic graph to model traveling back in time from t = k to t = i.
We proof in this paper that the grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven paradox are precluded for a general
n-state model (with n < ∞). Following the formulation of Lee [1], suppose a signal is send back at time t = k to the
past at time t = i. For all other times, information propagates forward in a Markovian manner (as shown in Fig. 1).
Let the transition matrices for the forward propagating signal at time t = j be T j(σ j|σ j−1). Time t = i is special as
signals are propagating from t = i − 1 and t = k > i. Let the transition matrix be Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk). Finally, let πm be a
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
60  Hwee Kuan Lee / Physics Procedia 15 (2011) 59–63
sequence of states starting from t = 1 to t = m. The basic equations governing the transition matrices are given in [1],
0 ≤ T j(σ j|σ j−1) ≤ 1∀ j (1)
0 ≤ Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) ≤ 1 (2)∑
πm
P(πm) = 1 (3)
∑
σ j
T j(σ j|σ j−1) = 1 (4)
∑
σi
Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) = 1 (5)
∑
σi,σk
Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk)V(σk |σi) = 1 (6)
Where P(πm) is the probability of sampling the sequence πm and V(σk |σi) is the probability of sampling the state σk
at time t = k given that the state is σi at time t = i. Refer to [1] for a thorough explanation.
It is suﬃcient to describe both grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradoxes using two states,
i.e. dead or alive and proven or unproven. In this paper, we want to study how these paradoxes can be embedded
in a higher dimensional space in which the world consists of more states than just dead/alive or proven/unproven.
Using the grandfather paradox as an illustration, let Ω be the set of n discrete states describing the world. Among
these states, there is a non-empty subset of states Ωd ⊂ Ω in which the agent is dead and a subset of states Ωa ⊂ Ω
in which the agent is alive. We presume dead and alive events are mutually exclusive, that is, Ωd ∩ Ωa = ∅ and since
the agent can only be dead or alive, Ωd ∪ Ωa = Ω. We use a simple speciﬁc example to explain further. Suppose that
the agent can be male or female and dead or alive. If for simplicity, we ignore all other states in the world except
for male/female and dead/alive. Then Ω consists of four states, (1) male and dead, (2) male and alive (3) female and
dead (4) female and alive. Ωa consists of two states, male and alive and female and alive. Ωd consists of the other
two states, male and dead, female and dead. If we consider dead/alive to be in one subspace and male/female to be
in another subspace, then Ω is just the direct product of these subspaces. Once, this simple example is understood,
it is not diﬃcult to generalize to arbitrary number of states. The above argument holds for the Deutsch’s unproven
theorem paradox.
1. Probabilistic View of Causality
Two alternative views, deterministic and probabilistic view of causality existed for a long time. For example, in
the deterministic view, if you study hard, you will pass the exams. However, one might get unlucky and fail the exams
even if he studies hard. There are other arguments to resolve this apparent contradiction, like one might study hard,
but not hard enough or there are other “hidden variables” not factored into the cause and eﬀect equation when making
the statement.
Probabilistic view of causality states that you will have a higher chance of passing the exams if you study hard.
The observation of studying hard and not passing the exams in this case is attributed to just being unlucky since there
is still non-zero chance of failing although this non-zero chance gets smaller with more hard work.
We take the probabilistic view of causality in this paper. A sequence of events happening in time happens with a
probability distribution. A realization of sequence of events also happens with a distribution. In addition, we assume
a Markov model, except for a single time point where a signal is send from the future (See Fig. 1). At this point, we
would like to elaborate on the eﬀect of signal from the future. This signal, does not cause an event to happen at time
t = i, but simply change the probability distribution of events at time t = i. This change in probability propagates
forward in time to aﬀect the probability distribution at time t = k (the time at which the signal was sent to i). The
change in probability distribution at various times should occur self-consistently.
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2. Generalized Grandfather Paradox
The grandfather paradox can be formulated in a more abstract form. Let Ω be the set of n discrete states. Let
Ωd ⊂ Ω,Ωd  ∅ be a non-empty subset of states that are analogous to the absorbing states in an absorbing Markov
Chain. The transition matrices T j(σi|σi−1) = 0 and Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) = 0 for σi−1 ∈ Ωd and σi  Ωd. We can’t go from
a state belonging to Ωd to a state not belonging Ωd. For example, the agent cannot transit from a dead state to an alive
state. Let Ωa = Ω\Ωd  ∅. Clearly,
Ωd ∪Ωa = Ω and Ωd ∩Ωa = ∅ (7)
Now let,
Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) =
{
N(σi|σi−1) for σk ∈ Ωd
S (σi|σi−1) for σk ∈ Ωa (8)
with S being a generalization of the killing matrix described in Lee [1]. That is, S brings all states σi−1 ∈ Ω into Ωd,
S (σi|σi−1) = 0 for all σi ∈ Ωa. Next deﬁne,
A(σi) =
∑
σk∈Ωa
V(σk |σi) (9)
we have A(σi) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωd and 0 ≤ A(σi) ≤ 1 for σi ∈ Ωa. Using Eq. (6) we obtain,∑
σi
(N − S )(σi|σi−1)A(σi) = 0 (10)
simplifying some more using the fact that S (σi|σi−1) = 0 for any σi ∈ Ωa and A(σi) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωd,∑
σi∈Ωa
N(σi|σi−1)A(σi) = 0 (11)
since A(σi) ≥ 0 and N(σi|σi−1) ≥ 0, for Eq. (11) to hold, we have either A(σi) = 0 or N(σi|σi−1) = 0 or both
equal zero for any σi. Let N(σi|σi−1) = 0 for σi ∈ Ω(1)a and N(σi|σi−1) > 0 for σi ∈ Ω(2)a with Ω(1)a ∪ Ω(2)a = Ωa.
N(σi|σi−1) = 0 implies that transition into a state σi ∈ Ω(1)a happens with zero probability. Hence all transitions must
be into a state σi ∈ Ω(2)a ∪ Ωd. If σi ∈ Ω(1)a then A(σi) = 0 implies that σk ∈ Ωd (see Eq. (9)). If σi ∈ Ωd, then
clearly σk ∈ Ωd. Hence for any possible σi−1 we have σk ∈ Ωd. All possible sequences of states leads to σk ∈ Ωd.
The generalized grandfather paradox is precluded because a contradiction cannot be generated by the matrix S since
σk ∈ Ωd with probability one. This conclusion is consistent with the grandfather paradox for two- and three-state
systems presented in Lee [1].
3. Generalized Deutsch’s Unproven Theorem Paradox
Let Ω be the set of states. Let Ωp ⊂ Ω,Ωp  ∅ and let Ωu = Ω\Ωp. Ωp represents the states in which the theorem
has been proven and Ωu represents the states in which the theorem is unproven. Let Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) = N(σi|σi−1) for
σk ∈ Ωu and Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) = S (σi|σi−1) for σk ∈ Ωp. This paradox assumes that the theorem is not proven in the
past, but is simply documented using signals from the future, once the proof is documented, it cannot get lost. V and
N must be of the form,
V(σk |σi) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωp and σk ∈ Ωu
V(σk |σi) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωu and σk ∈ Ωp∑
σk∈Ωp
V(σk |σi) = 1 for σi ∈ Ωp
∑
σk∈Ωu
V(σk |σi) = 1 for σi ∈ Ωu
∑
σi∈Ωu
N(σi|σi−1) = 1 for σi−1 (12)
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We also have σi−1 ∈ Ωu because the signal travels from the future at t = i and does not aﬀect the state at time t = i− 1.
Using Eq. (6),
∑
σi∈Ωu,σk∈Ωu N(σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi)+ (13)∑
σi∈Ωp,σk∈Ωu N(σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi)+∑
σi∈Ωu,σk∈Ωp S (σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi)+∑
σi∈Ωp,σk∈Ωp S (σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi) = 1
and using Eq. (12), we obtain
⇒
∑
σi∈Ωp
S (σi|σi−1) = 0 (14)
Since S (σi|σi−1) ≥ 0, the only way for its sum to be zero is that each term is zero S (σi|σi−1) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωp. The
Deutsch’s unproven paradox is precluded because the transition matrix S which is suppose to bring the proof from the
future is zero S (σi|σi−1) = 0 for and σi ∈ Ωp. That is to say, it is impossible to “document” the proof from the future
even if such signal travels from the future.
4. A Complimentary Set Paradox
We can construct another paradox by “combining” the grandfather paradox and the Deutsch’s unproven theorem
paradox. We call it the complimentary set paradox for reasons that will be obvious later. Let Ω be the set of n discrete
states. Let Ωb be a non-empty subset of Ω and Ω¯b = Ω\Ωb be the complimentary subset. Assume that the transition
matrix V(σk |σi) is non-ergodic, that is V(σk |σi) = 0 if σi and σk does not belong to the same subset Ωb and Ω¯b. Note
that this is also the case for the Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox. Let σk be the state at the future time t = k and
a signal is send to the time i < k such that if σk ∈ Ωb then the transition matrix brings σi into σi ∈ Ω¯b and vice versa.
In this construction, the subset σi belongs to (Ωb or Ω¯b) is always complimentary to the subset σk belongs to. This
explain why we call this a complimentary set paradox. The transition matrix Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) therefore can be written
in the form,
Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) =
{
N(σi|σi−1) for σk ∈ Ωb
S (σi|σi−1) for σk ∈ Ω¯b (15)
With N(σi|σi−1) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωb and S (σi|σi−1) = 0 for σi ∈ Ω¯b. This paradox is fundamentally diﬀerent from the
grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s unproven paradox. The grandfather paradox is precluded because the agent must
be dead at time t = k hence cannot travel back in time to kill himself. The normalization condition of Eq. (3) can
still be satisﬁed. The summation sums over all sequences in which the agent is died before time t = k. The Deutsch’s
unproven theorem paradox is precluded because the probability of recording the proof is zero. The normalization
condition of Eq. (3) is still satisﬁed where the summation sums over only sequences in which the proof is non-
existence. This paradox is radically diﬀerent in which the normalization condition of Eq. (3) cannot hold at all! To
proof this, we show that Eq. (6) cannot be satisﬁed.∑
σi,σk
T (σi|σi−1, σk)V(σk |σi) =
∑
σk∈Ωb,σi
N(σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi) +
∑
σk∈Ω¯b,σi
S (σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi)
=
∑
σk ∈ Ωb
σi ∈ Ωb
N(σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi) +
∑
σk ∈ Ω¯b
σi ∈ Ω¯b
S (σi|σi−1)V(σk |σi)
= 0 + 0  1 (16)
In the second line, we make use of the fact that V(σk |σi) = 0 for σi, σk not belonging to the same subset. For
the last line, we use N(σi|σi−1) = 0 for σi ∈ Ωb and S (σi|σi−1) = 0 for σi ∈ Ω¯b. In fact, any sequence πm happens
with zero probability. This combination of transition matrices N, S ,V cannot exist under the current framework. The
paradox can be resolved if we relax the condition of V to make it ergodic, that is, V(σk |σi)  0 when σi, σk does not
belong to the same subset.
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5. Conclusion
It seems the apparent time travel paradoxes come from the fact that V(σk |σi) is non-ergodic. This is the case for
the time travel paradoxes described in this paper. It is also suggestive to infer that there will be no paradox if V(σk |σi)
is ergodic and k is far enough into the future from i. This statement remains to be proven rigorously, however a
hand-waving argument is as follows. Suppose a signal is send from time t = k to time t = i to change the distribution
of states at time t = i. Since V(σk |σi) is ergodic and k is far away in the future, one can ﬁnd a self-consistent set of
sequences of states linking σi and σk.
Sections (2) and (3) avoided the time travel paradoxes by precluding them. These paradoxes can also be avoided
by allowing V(σk |σi) to be ergodic. For the grandfather paradox can be avoided if we allow a small chance of
resurrection. The agent travels back in time from t = k to t = i to kill himself, between the time t = i and t = k, the
“dead” agent resurrected so that he can then travel back in time again at t = k to kill himself. Another way to avoid
the paradox is to assume that the agent travels back in time but did not succeed in killing himself.
The Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox can be avoided if we allow the document to get lost and then the theorem
re-derived again between the times t = i and t = k. In this way, the re-derived prove can be sent to the past to be
recorded and lost before it was re-derived again.
We have shown in this paper that the grandfather paradox and the Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox are pre-
cluded for the case in which the agent lives in a world with n discrete states. For future work, we would like to ﬁnd
out if similar paradoxes can arise when the transition matrix V(σk |σi) is ergodic.
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